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The Indian manufacturing sector has not increased its 
share in output or employment along expected lines. 
The aggregate trends in this sector at the 3-digit level of 
the National Industrial Classification from 1983 to 2017 
are investigated here. Using data from the Annual 
Survey of Industries obtained from the EPWRFITS, it 
identifies three sub-periods within the overall period: 
1988–96, 1996–2006, and 2006–17. A shift-share 
decomposition is used to show that most of the 
decline in the labour to capital ratio can be explained 
by within-industry changes. Finally, industries are 
analysed with respect to their capacity to deliver job 
and wage growth.
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The manufacturing sector, in particular the sub-sector consisting of relatively larger and profi t-oriented fi rms, occupies a place of importance in development economics 
from the point of view of structural transformation (Lewis 
1954). In recent decades, however, it has become clear that 
many developing countries are failing to increase the share of 
manufacturing in total value added or employment (Rodrik 
2016). In India, for example, the workforce has been shifting 
from agriculture to the informal economy, mostly in construction 
and services, such as petty retail and domestic work (Basole et 
al 2018). Recent evidence also suggests that, since the 1990s, 
the manufacturing sector is no longer as important a driver of 
economic growth as it once was (Szirmai and Verspagen 2015). 
South Asia, in particular, as opposed to East and South-east 
Asia, seems to be in the service-led structural change category, 
with India leading the pack (Amjad et al 2015). On the other 
hand, there is also the view that no country has become high-
income on a sustained basis without a substantial increase in 
manufacturing share of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 
employment. Hence, developing countries should not give up 
on manufacturing-led structural change yet; rather there is 
need for a more nuanced understanding of what works and 
what does not work, at the policy level (Haraguchi et al 2018).
Table 1 (p 36) shows the share of manufacturing in value 
added and employment in India since the early 1980s. As can 
be seen, the sector has failed to expand by either measure. 
However, analyses at the aggregate level hide substantial var-
iation across different manufacturing industries. Further, if 
we make a distinction between relatively larger fi rms in the 
organised sector versus microenterprises in the unorganised 
sector, a more complex story emerges. Organised manufactur-
ing employment as a share of total manu facturing employment 
declined from 25.5% in 1983 to 15.4% in 2004. But, since then 
has increased to 27.5%. Particularly since 2005, employment in 
the unorganised manufacturing sector has risen much more slowly 
compared to the organised sector (Thomas and Johny 2018).
The present study is motivated by two questions. First, 
which periods in the recent past have seen a relatively better 
performance of the organised manufacturing sector? Second, 
which industries have performed relatively better? Both these 
questions have been, thus far, insuffi ciently explored in the 
literature. The answers to these questions can form the basis 
for policymaking that intends to promote this sector. 
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The study traces the evo-
lution of key parameters in 
this sector over a 34-year 
period from 1983 to 2017 to 
identify periods of better or 
worse performance, and 
industries that have per-
formed better or worse than 
average. We extend and 
build upon the analysis of 
Kannan and Raveendran 
(2009) and Roy (2016). 
Using the Bai-Perron test for 
structural breaks, we show 
that the entire period can be divided into three clearly different 
sub-periods. The fi rst period, from 1988 to 1996, is character-
ised by weak employment growth, rapid substitution of capital 
for labour, and rising wages. The second period (1996 to 2006) 
displays loss of employment, slower substitution of capital for 
labour, and stagnant wages alongside a growing divergence 
between wages and productivity. The third period (2006 to 
2017) shows strong employment growth as well as rising wages, 
despite a renewed decline in the labour–capital ratio. This is 
also the only period during which the labour share of income 
stops falling and even shows a rise in nominal terms.
We also construct a typology of industries based on whether 
they have managed to deliver employment growth as well as 
wage growth. We fi nd that large employers such as apparel 
and knitwear have displayed the capacity to create jobs as well 
as deliver wage growth. On the other hand, industries such as 
textiles, machinery, and electrical equipment have failed on 
both fronts. Other industries show a more mixed profi le, deliv-
ering on one dimension, but not the other. This diversity calls 
for further work on elucidating the specifi c reasons at the policy 
and industry level.
Literature Review
Based on several recent studies, the following stylised facts can 
be highlighted in the Indian organised manufacturing sector: 
rising capital–labour ratio (capital intensity of production) 
across all industries, low output elasticity of employment 
(around 0.5 or less), growing divergence between real wages 
and labour productivity, falling labour share of income, and 
rising proportion of contract workers (Abraham and Sasikumar 
2017; Goldar and Sadhukhan 2015; Kapoor 2015, 2016; Kapoor 
and Krishnapriya 2017; Sen and Das 2015).
A question that has been raised in the literature but not sat-
isfactorily answered yet is, to what extent the falling labour–
capital ratio at the aggregate level is due to a fall in the ratio 
within each industry and to what extent it is due to the faster 
growth of relatively more capital-intensive industries? The latter 
mechanism is suggested by both Kannan and Raveendran 
(2009) and ILO (2009) as a mechanism for job-loss growth. 
The argument is that rising inequality results in greater demand 
for manufactured commodities that are products of relatively 
more capital-intensive as well as more import-intensive industries; 
for example, metal and chemicals-based products, electronics, 
and vehicles. However, there is some evidence that the capital–
labour ratio has increased in capital-intensive as well as labour-
intensive industries (Kapoor 2015; Sen and Das 2015). This 
points to a greater contribution of within industry factors.
The divergence between wages and productivity, the former 
growing much slower than the latter, has been widely discussed 
for economies of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), but relatively less attention has been 
paid to this phenomenon in India. One of the fi rst papers to 
point it out is Kannan and Raveendran (2009). But, the authors 
do not discuss it much. Abraham and Sasikumar (2017) discuss 
it in the context of falling wage shares. Nagaraj (2018) also re-
ports the same fi nding in the context of a discussion on the effi -
cacy of labour laws. His point is that the divergence points to the 
weak position of Indian labour vis-à-vis capital even within the 
relatively privileged organised manufacturing working class.
The closely related trend of a fall in labour share of income 
has, once again, been reported across the globe. Two recent 
studies have examined this in India. The fi rst study by Abraham 
and Sasikumar (2017) performs a shift-share decomposition and 
fi nds that, of the decline in wage share of 25.6 percentage 
points, 75.6% is explained by the  shift component. That is, the 
falling share of wages is mostly due to a fall within each indus-
try rather than a faster growth of industries with lower wage 
shares. The study uses an industry–state–year panel and a fi rst-
difference regression model to show that contractualisation, 
increasing female share in permanent workers, and intensifi -
cation of work (more days of work in place of more workers) 
are determinants of the falling wage share. The second study by 
Jayadev and Narayan (2018) also identifi es the rise of contract 
labour as an important determinant alongside trade openness. 
It should be noted that the trend of declining wage share goes 
back to the 1960s (Basu and Das 2015).
Two further questions are interesting from the point of view 
of policy measures to promote manufacturing jobs. One, are 
there periods in recent history when the organised manufac-
turing sector has performed relatively better in terms of job 
creation? Two, which are the industries that have managed to 
post job growth in addition to wage and productivity growth? 
These two questions have been addressed less frequently. Goldar 
(2011) reports that employment growth rate in organised 
manufacturing accelerated sharply after 2004–05, while in 
comparison between 1995–96 and 2003–04, employment in 
this sector fell at the rate of 1.5% per annum. Das et al (2017) 
fi nd structural breaks within a two-year window (1997–99) 
for employment, output, wage rate, and labour productivity. 
Roy (2016) identifi es the top 10 industries that have performed 
relatively better in delivering output growth, wages, and 
employment in the period between 2008 and 2012. 
Data and Methods
Annual survey of industries: We use data from the Annual 
Survey of Industries (ASI) concorded series at the 3-digit 
National Industrial Classifi cation (NIC) level made available by 
Table 1: Share of Manufacturing 
(Organised and Unorganised) in 
Employment and Value Added 
in India (1983–2015) (%)
Year Employment Value-added
 Share Share
1983 10.6 17.3
1987 12.2 16.8
1993 10.6 16.5
1999 11.0 15.8
2004 12.3 16.4
2011 12.6 16.1
2017 12.1 14.9
Sources: National Sample Survey 
Employment–Unemployment Surveys, various 
years; World Development Indicators, 
various years.
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the Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation’s 
India Time Series database (henceforth, EPWRFITS).
Over the years, the ASI sampling frame and method have 
changed somewhat, with the most signifi cant change being 
the exclusion of certain industries starting 1999 (Kannan and 
Raveendran 2009). These industries have been omitted from 
our data set in order to retain consistency across the entire 
period. Our fi nal data set spans 34 years (1982–83 to 2016–17, 
the most recent year for which the ASI data are available) and 
55 industries. For convenience, we refer to a particular fi nan-
cial year by the second calendar year. For example, 2015–16 is 
referred to as 2016.
Variables: We defl ate nominal wages and salaries by the 
consumer price index for industrial workers (CPI-IW), nomi-
nal output and value added by the wholesale price index for 
manufactured products (WPI-MP), and nominal capital stock 
by the wholesale price index for machines and machinery 
(WPI-MM). Defl ators were obtained from EPWRFITS and 
rebased to the year 2004–05. Monthly defl ator data was 
averaged for the fi nancial year (April to March) to create the 
annual series. 
The variable “total persons engaged” is used to measure 
employment trends. But the trends and results are not sub-
stantially altered by using production workers only. 
Capital stock is calculated by the perpetual inventory method 
by converting fi xed capital at historical cost to replacement 
cost as outlined in Balakrishnan and Pushpangadan (1994) 
and Kannan and Raveendran (2009). More details on measuring 
capital stock from ASI data can be found in Raychaudhuri 
(1996), Rao (1996), and Datta and Bhattacharya (2007).
W e defi ne capital intensity as the capital–labour ratio or the 
ratio of real fi xed capital to total persons engaged. Labour 
intensity is defi ned as the inverse of this ratio. We have con-
fi rmed that substituting number of workers for total persons 
engaged does not alter the trends and results. Labour produc-
tivity is defi ned as the ratio of real gross value added (GVA) to 
number of workers or employees (once again, the trends are 
similar for both). The wage share is defi ned as share of wages 
in real GVA. Using gross output instead of GVA does not sub-
stantially alter the productivity or wage share trends. 
Decomposition: We perform a shift-share decomposition 
analysis to identify the relative contributions of inter- versus 
intra-industry changes in the labour to capital ratio. The com-
ponents of the decomposition are: 
lt+1 – lt = li
t(si
t+1 – si
t) + (li
t+1 – li
t)si
t + (li
t+1 – li
t)(si
t+1 – si
t)  …(1)
where l = L/K; si = Ki /K
The fi rst term is the labour–capital ratio for a given industry 
multiplied by the change in the share of capital stock of that 
industry. The second term is the share of a given industry’s 
capital stock multiplied by the change in labour intensity. The 
third term is an interaction term.
Thus, the change in labour intensity at the aggregate level 
can be decomposed into an intra-industry component that 
accounts for within industry changes in labour intensity, an 
inter-industry component that accounts for the changing 
importance of a given industry in terms of its share in the total 
capital stock, and an interaction component.
We also decompose the labour share of income as follows: 
(wL)/Y = L/K * (wL)/L * K/Y …(2)
where w is the wage rate, L is number of workers, Y is output 
or value added, and K is the capital stock. Thus, the share of 
wages in output or value added can be expressed as the prod-
uct of the labour–capital ratio, the wage rate, and the capital–
output ratio. It follows that the growth rate of the wage share 
can be expressed as the sum of the growth rates of the other 
three ratios. In the study, we use GVA as a measure of Y.
Analysis of structural breaks: We are interested in fi nding 
out if growth rates of key variables, such as employment and 
real wages, have changed over time. In particular, it is useful 
to know if there are statistically distinguishable “regimes,” that 
is, breakpoints at which the growth rate changes. Since these 
breakpoints are not known in advance, a standard Chow test 
cannot be performed on the coeffi cients of a log-linear regression. 
Further, since the possibility of multiple breaks cannot be ruled 
out, the supremum Wald (Quandt) test also cannot be used in 
this case. The Bai-Perron test (Bai and Perron 1998, 2003) has 
been developed specifi cally for identifying multiple, unknown 
breakpoints sequentially. We performed this test on the 
employment and real wage trends using the EViews software.1
Aggregate Analysis
Employment, wage, and labour intensity trends: Figure 1a 
(p 38) shows the absolute levels of employment (in million) and 
output (in lakh crore) in organised manufacturing from 1983 
to 2017. Employment includes production workers, managers, 
supervisors, and clerical staff. After a small initial fall in absolute 
employment till 1986, there was growth till the mid-1990s. 
The worst period for organised manufacturing employment 
was between 1997 and 2002. This decline is not an artefact of 
the removal of certain industries from ASI coverage (see the 
section “Data and Methods”). After 2006, employment in this 
sector grew again. 
Growth in employment in any period, however, is much 
weaker compared to the rise in output, indicating a large 
increase in labour productivity over the period. This is made 
clear in Figure 1b (p 38) which shows both trends indexed to 
the fi rst year (1983). While employment roughly doubles in 
this period, output goes up nearly 15 times. Thus, the growth 
elasticity of employment has been low in this sector. The 
aggregate employment elasticity over the entire period is 
0.26. But there is substantial variation from year to year. 
Figure 2 (p 38) shows annual employment elasticities for the 
entire period (excluding two outlying years).
One important reason for low employment elasticity in the 
organised manufacturing sector has been the rising capital 
intensity of production. As per ASI data, in the early 1980s, 
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`2 lakh of invested capital (in 2005 rupees) created one job in this 
sector. By 2017, this had risen to ` 27 lakh. Putting this in terms 
of the labour to capital (rather than capital to labour) ratio, 
around 50–60 jobs were sustained by `1 crore of fi xed capital 
(in 2005 rupees) in the early 1980s. This fell to around 11 jobs 
in 1998 and to less than 5 today. However, the rise in the 
aggregate capital–labour ratio also shows variation in the 
three periods identifi ed for employment. And, the same sub-
periods can be identifi ed in the real wage rate series as well. 
Wages grew from the early 1980s till about 1996. After which 
there was a period of stagnation and even decline, until 2007. 
Subsequently, they have been increasing (Figure 3). 
We performed a Bai-Perron structural breakpoint test to 
identify the break years. The results are given in the Appendix 
(p 44). Three years emerge as statistically signifi cant breaks in 
the employment trend: 1988, 1996, and 2006. For the wage 
rate series, the breaks identifi ed are nearly the same: 1988, 
1996, and 2005. We exclude the fi rst period 1983 to 1988 from 
consideration due to insuffi cient data and focus on three dis-
tinct regimes or sub-periods: 1988 to 1996, 1996 to 2006, and 
2006 to 2017. In the fi rst period, employment and wages grew 
slowly. The second period actually saw a decline in both, and the 
third, from 2006 to the most recent available year, saw em-
ployment and wages growing much faster than at any other 
time since the early 1980s. 
Perhaps unexpectedly, it appears that rising employment–wages 
regimes are associated with a rising capital–labour ratio while the 
falling employment–stagnant wages regime is associated with a 
stagnant ratio. Strikingly, the most recent period (2006 to 2017) 
demonstrates a rise in the capital intensity, but also a concomitant 
rise in employment as well as real wage rate. The output elasticity 
of employment in the fi rst period is 0.22. In the second period, it 
falls to a mere 0.012 and grows to 0.46 in the third period.
This indicates that rising capital intensity should not 
straightforwardly be taken to be a negative development from 
the point of view of employment generation in the manufac-
turing sector. Rather, if the period also happens to be one of 
strong output growth, this may result in rising employment 
and, hence, also rising wages.
Of course, as might be expected, the rising capital intensity 
of production has tempered the ability of output growth to 
generate employment in the sector. An industry fi xed effects 
panel regression (weighted by the initial share of each industry 
in total employment) shows the average output elasticity of 
employment over the 34-year period to be 0.23. If we control 
for capital intensity, the elasticity rises to 0.70. That is, a dou-
bling of output would result in a 70% increase in employment, 
were capital intensity to remain constant. However, given the 
rising capital intensity, a doubling of output only increases 
employment by 23%. 
Figure 1b: Indexed Trends in Gross Real Output and Employment (1983 = 1)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ASI 3-digit concorded data from EPWRFITS.
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Figure 1a: Total Employment (million) and Output (lakh crore) in Organised 
Manufacturing, 1983–2017
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ASI 3-digit concorded data from EPWRFITS.
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Figure 3: Real Wage Rate (2005 rupees) and Capital–Labour Ratio, 1983–2017
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ASI 3-digit concorded data from EPWRFITS. Wage 
data is missing for 1999.
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Figure 2: Annual Output Elasticity of Employment across All Industries
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The wage-productivity gap and wage share: Rising capital 
intensity is expected to increase labour productivity. Between 
1983 and 2017, labour productivity, as measured by real gross 
value added per employee, went up six times. The question 
that arises from a quality of jobs perspective is how were the 
productivity gains shared between labour and capital? For this, 
we need to look at the relationship between wages and pro-
ductivity. The growing dominance of capital in the production 
process suggests that a greater portion of value added would 
accrue to capital owners as a result. The expected divergence 
between the real wage rate and real productivity per worker is 
indeed clearly observed (Figure 4a). On average, the real 
wage rate grew at the rate of 1.4% per year, while productivity 
grew at 5.5% per year in real terms. This points to a large 
shift in distribution in favour of capital. In the panel data set, 
on average, a doubling of labour productivity is associated 
with only an 18% rise in wages. 
There is another divergence visible in Figure 4a that has 
not received much attention in the literature, that between 
wages per worker paid to production workers and emolu-
ments per employee which include benefi ts and bonuses 
paid to managerial and supervisory staff. This can be seen 
more clearly in Figure 4b. After growing in step with each 
other until  the late 1990s, the two diverge. Subsequently, 
the real wage rate enters a period of stagnation that 
coincides with the absolute fall in employment discussed 
earlier, while emoluments rise steadily. The gap between 
the two has grown steadily since then, even after the wage 
rate started rising post-2006. The emoluments to wages 
ratio rose from 1.2 in 1983 to 1.7 in 2016. A possible factor 
contributing to this divergence is the rise in proportion of 
contract workers, or workers employed via contractors and 
not paid through the fi rm’s payroll, that has occurred 
precisely over the same period. As has been discussed by 
others, contract workers are paid a fraction of permanent 
worker wages, often for similar work (Nayanjyoti and 
Chakraborty 2018; Kapoor and Krishnapriya 2017). Of course, 
it is also possible that production-line wages have increased 
far more slowly than salaries and bonuses of the supervisory 
and managerial staff.
The growing divergence between productivity and wages/
emoluments implies a falling share of labour in value added. 
Figure 5a (p 40) reports the share of wages in gross value 
added in real as well as nominal terms. The decline in real 
wage share is steeper than the nominal decline, due to the 
fact that the CPI has diverged from the WPI over time. Thus, 
two things are to be noted regarding the declining labour 
share of income in organised manufacturing. First, that there 
is a large, secular decline till 2008 in both the nominal and 
real shares. Afterwards, the nominal share rises slightly, 
while the real share stagnates. In nominal terms, the share of 
wages in value added fell from 27% in 1983 to a low of 
9.3% in 2008. Subsequently, it has increased to around 13% 
in 2017. Second, the divergence between the real and the 
nominal shares has to do with the fact that wages have not 
increased as much in real terms as has output, due to faster 
rise in the CPI compared to WPI.
H ere, one can ask what part of the trend in labour share is 
attributable to changes in labour intensity of production, how 
much to wage trends, and how much to capital productivity. 
As indicated in the “Data and Methods” section, the wage 
share of value added can be decomposed into these three ratios. 
Since the product of the three ratios, the labour–capital ratio 
(L/K), the wage rate (wL/L), and the inverse of capital produc-
tivity (K/GVA) is the wage share of value added (wL/GVA), it 
follows that the sum of the three growth rates will be the 
growth rate of the wage share.
Figure 5b (p 40) shows the results of the decomposition 
analysis. The real wage-rate trend does not explain much of 
the decline in wage share. Though, of course, a higher rate of 
growth of real wages would have counteracted the pull-down 
effect of the other two variables. Most of the decline in wage 
share is accounted for by the falling L/K ratio, which is coun-
teracted to a greater or lesser degree by falling capital produc-
tivity. Importantly, in the period between 2002 and 2007, 
when L/K ratio does not fall as rapidly, capital productivity is 
growing, resulting in a continued fall in the wage share. 
Further, wage growth is close to zero during this period as 
well. Only after 2008 does the wage share fl atten out. This is a 
result of contradictory trends: a falling L/K ratio counteracted 
Figure 4b: Indexed Real Wage Rate and Real Emoluments Rate, 1983 = 1
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ASI 3-digit concorded data from EPWRFITS.
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on ASI 3-digit concorded data from EPWRFITS.
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by falling capital productivity and rising wage growth. It 
should be emphasised that the decomposition analysis does 
not have a causal interpretation. That is, one cannot conclude 
from the foregoing analysis that the falling L/K ratio causes 
a decline in the wage share. Rather, it should be seen as an 
exercise that points to factors that need further investigation. 
We discuss this further in the “Discussion” section.
Industry Analysis
In this section, we examine the industry-level variation in fi ve 
key variables—labour–capital ratio, labour productivity, wage 
share, real wage rate, and employment elasticity. 
Labour intensity, labour productivity, and wage share: Rising 
capital intensity, at the aggregate level, could be the result of a 
more rapid growth of relatively more capital-intensive indus-
tries occurring due to higher demand for products requiring 
more mechanised methods of production. Typical examples 
are automobiles and consumer electronics. This hypothesis 
has been advanced in the literature as an explanation for weak 
job creation in manufacturing. However, it is also possible that 
rising aggregate capital–labour ratio is a result of rising capital 
intensity of production within all industries. 
As noted earlier, capital intensity has risen in relatively more 
labour-intensive as well as relatively more capital-intensive 
industries. Figure 6a (p 41) shows this phenomenon for a 
selection of industries. Note that the inverse of the capital–labour 
ratio (that is, the labour–capital ratio) is displayed. The indus-
tries have been chosen to represent a wide range of initial 
labour intensities from furniture and textiles to vehicles and 
petroleum products. Note that the textile industry is four times 
as labour intensive as appliances or vehicles, but it displays 
very similar dynamics. A scatter of plot of the growth rate of 
labour–capital ratio against initial level of the same ratio for 
all 55 industries shows no discernible pattern, confi rming the 
conclusion that the trend towards falling labour intensity is 
independent of its initial value (data not shown).
To further test this, we perform a shift-share decomposition 
of the labour–capital ratio to estimate the relative contribu-
tions of the within and between industry components in the 
decline of the aggregate ratio (see “Data and Methods” for 
details). The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 6b 
(p 41). The jagged lines show actual growth rates year on year 
and the sum of the three components. As expected, the two 
lines coincide exactly. Each bar is split into three components, 
intra-industry change in labour–capital ratio, inter-industry 
change, and the interaction term.
As we saw before, the labour–capital ratio declines for most 
of the 1980s and 1990s, is steady in the early 2000s, and starts 
declining again after 2008. But, more importantly, we see that 
the fall in the intra-industry component dominates for almost 
every year in the sample. The inter-industry component is pos-
itive for some years, indicating that labour-intensive industries 
actually grew faster, contrary to the hypothesis that falling 
aggregate labour intensity has to do with faster growth of rela-
tively more capital-intensive industries. Thus, one can conclude 
from the decomposition analysis that the decline in the L/K 
ratio is due to rising capital intensity within each industry rather 
than due to faster growth of more capital-intensive industries.
As expected from growing mechanisation, there have been 
large gains in labour productivity across all industries. From 
the point of view of welfare, it is important to know the divi-
sion of these productivity gains between wages and profi ts. 
In general, it is clear that wage growth is much lower than 
productivity growth for all industries. Figure 7 (p 41) shows 
this relationship in a scatter plot along with a line of best fi t 
and a line of equality.2 The fact that nearly all industries lie 
above the line of equality means that wage gains have not kept 
pace with productivity gains anywhere in organised manufac-
turing. Thus, it is not surprising that there is an almost universal 
decline in the wage share (data not shown). The line of best fi t 
shows the average relationship between the two variables and 
the dispersion in both directions shows which industries are 
better or worse than average at translating productivity gains 
into wage gains.
Some industries such as petroleum (NIC 232), tobacco (NIC 
160), non-ferrous metals (NIC 272), and motor vehicles (NIC 341) 
lie far above the line of best fi t, indicating a worse performance 
in translating productivity increases into wage increases. On the 
other hand, some big employers such as knitwear (NIC 173), 
leather (NIC 191), and footwear (NIC 192) lie below the line, 
indicating lower productivity growth, but a better-than-average 
Figure 5a: Real and Nominal Wages as a Share of Gross Value Added
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performance translating it into wage growth. Other important 
employment-intensive industries like textiles (NIC 171) and 
food (NIC 151–154) lie very close to the line, indicating an aver-
age performance.
Employment elasticity and wages: Thus far, we have seen 
that certain aggregate trends such as falling labour intensity, 
rising productivity and wages, and falling wage share are seen 
in almost every industry, albeit to varying degrees. Industries 
also differ widely in their employment growth over the data 
period. Employment in apparel increased 14 times over the 
entire period, while employment in textiles as well as food 
actually fell. It is probably not a coincidence that these same 
two industries (food and textiles) are the largest employers in 
the informal sector. It should also be noted that apparel and 
footwear, two industries that have done well on the employment 
front, are also the two least capital-intensive industries.
However, as noted earlier, capital intensity is only one 
determinant of employment. Both textiles and plastics are 
very similar in their capital intensities but very different in 
their employment performances. Employment in plastics grew 
nine times over the period while, as noted before, employment 
in textiles has fallen. Clearly, output growth is the relevant 
factor to consider here. While plastics still employed only half 
as many workers as textiles in 2017, in output terms the former 
has grown 48 times over the entire period, while textiles has 
only grown six times.
But, even controlling for output growth, there is wide variation 
in employment generation capacity from knitwear (NIC 173) 
with a healthy elasticity of 0.7 to saw-milling and planing of 
wood (NIC 201) with a value of -0.5. Some important employers 
that have posted very lacklustre elasticities are textiles 
(NIC 171) and food (NIC 154), while large employers displaying 
robust elasticities are knitwear (NIC 173), other textiles (NIC 
172), leather (NIC 191), and footwear (NIC 192).
Combining the elasticity and wage-rate data, we can answer 
the question of which industries have been relatively better at 
both job creation and delivering wage growth. We do this 
analysis only for the most recent sub-period that has seen rapid 
employment and wage growth.
Figures 8a and 8b (p 42) show a scatter plot of elasticity versus 
wage-rate growth. Each data point is an industry labelled with 
its 3-digit NIC, and the size of the circle indicates the share of 
an industry in total employment in 2006. The horizontal and 
vertical lines are median values. 
Several points are worth noting. First, note that the 
majority of industries display positive elasticity and wage 
growth. Second, there is large variation in this overall pat-
tern. As we have seen already in the previous analysis, some 
important industries, such as apparel (NIC 181) and knitwear 
(NIC 173), have performed quite well on both fronts, placing 
them in or near the top-right quadrant. Other industries 
that had a big share of employment in 2006, such as textiles 
(NIC 171), have performed poorly on both fronts with zero 
wage growth and almost no employment generation capacity 
in the organised factory sector. And then, there are big 
employers such as food processing and products (NIC 153, 
154) that perform better in terms of wage growth than 
employment generation. 
Several large employers (in 2006) such as machinery (NIC 
291), paper (NIC 210), and chemicals (NIC 241) are underper-
formers on both fronts. And, others such as processing of 
fruits, vegetables, meat (NIC 151), iron and steel (NIC 271), 
and glass (NIC 261) have displayed low elasticities, albeit 
with above median growth in wages. Others, such as other 
chemicals (NIC 242) and non-metallic minerals (NIC 269), 
have shown better than median elasticities, but very 
Figure 7: Relationship between Growth Rate of Labour Produtivity and 
Growth Rate of Wages by Industry
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Figure 6b: Shift-share Decomposition of the Labour–Capital Ratio
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low wage growth. We comment further on this typology in 
the next section.
Discussion
Sub-periods in the aggregate trends: The analysis of aggre-
gate trends, using the Bai-Perron structural breakpoint test, 
reveals three distinct sub-periods in the entire period from 
1983 to 2017. The fi rst period from 1988 to 1996 is character-
ised by employment growth (albeit weak), rapid substitution 
of capital for labour, and rising wages and emoluments. The 
second period (1996 to 2006) displays the weakest employment 
generation, slower substitution of capital for labour, and stag-
nant wages alongside emerging divergence between wages 
and emoluments. The third period (2006 to 2017) shows strong 
employment generation as well as rising wages, despite a 
renewed decline in the labour–capital ratio and a steadily 
growing divergence between wages and emoluments as well 
as wages and productivity. This is also the only period during 
which the labour share of income stops falling and even shows 
a rise in nominal terms.
What factors may be relevant in explaining these differences? 
While it is true that the early 1980s was a period of declining 
employment and the subsequent increase in jobs was weak, 
leading to the earliest discussion on “jobless growth” (Nagaraj 
2000), the transition that takes place in the mid-1990s is much 
larger. This decline in employment is not an artefact of the 
coverage changes in ASI around this time because our analysis 
excludes the industries that were dropped from coverage and 
even industries, such as apparel, that show strong employment 
growth over the entire period stagnated during this period. So 
far as we know, there is no satisfactory explanation for this in 
the literature. Rani and Unni (2004) analysed output and 
employment trends in three sub-periods, 1985 to 1990, 1990 to 
1995, and 1995 to 2000. The authors attribute weak employment 
growth in the last period to labour law reforms that allowed 
fi rms with more than 100 workers to retrench more easily and to 
public sector downsizing. They also note that by the mid-1990s, 
import tariffs had been reduced in most industries, including con-
sumer goods. Vashisht (2016) also discusses the gradually increas-
ing nature of trade liberalisation in the 1990s and, notes that the 
manufacturing sector downturn became more pronounced 
when quotas on imported consumer goods were removed.
The improvement in performance, in wages as well as em-
ployment, starting 2005–06, has also been widely commented 
on, but once again, satisfactory explanations for it are lacking. 
On the employment front, an important factor is the shift in 
the labour force from the unorganised to the organised sector. 
Thomas and Johny (2018) note that the pattern of employment 
growth in the manufacturing sector is very different in this 
recent period compared to the 1990s. Whereas, earlier factory 
employment was comparatively stagnant and employment in 
the unorganised sector was increasing, the pattern was more 
or less reversed after 2005. This indicates a redistribution of 
employment away from the unorganised to the organised sector.
This does not imply, however, that the new jobs were formal 
jobs. It seems likely that the relaxation of the labour law imple-
mentation resulted in a shift away from subcontracting work to 
small fi rms in the unorganised sector to production in-house 
with contract workers. 
Industry-level analysis: Industry-level analysis corroborates 
that the aggregate trends for the labour–capital ratio and the 
wage share are observed for the overwhelming majority of 
industries. Thus, the main lesson based on this study (labour–
capital ratio) and Abraham and Sasikumar (2017) (wage share) is 
that within industry factors are the main drivers of the decline 
in both cases. This suggests that policy variables that affect 
all industries equally, such as the national and international 
Table 2: A Typology of Industries
Type A Type B Type C Type D
Leather Meat, fish, fruits, etc General purpose  Tobacco
  machinery 
Footwear Grain, mill products Basic chemicals Non-ferrous metals
Plastics Other food products Electricity  Man-made
  distribution  fibres 
  apparatus 
Knitwear Apparel Motor vehicles
Iron and steel Textiles Publishing
Other chemical 
products
Type A: above median wage growth and elasticity; Type B: above median wage growth and 
below median elasticity; Type C: below median wage growth and above median elasticity; 
Type D: below median wage growth and below median elasticity.
Figure 8: Output Elasticity of Employment versus Wage Growth for All Industries (2006–2017)
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macroeconomic climate, ease of borrowing, or labour legisla-
tion may be more important factors than industry-specifi c 
variables such as technology or differential demand. However, 
there is some variation in the extent of decline of the labour–
capital ratio, and it would be of interest to see how it is related 
to capital subsidies received by particular industries or the 
extent of exposure to the global market.
The across-industry variation is much larger for employment 
elasticity and wage rate. This observation prompted us to 
examine the relationship between growth in the wage rate and 
employment elasticity in order to construct the typology of 
industries shown in Table 2 (p 42). Here, we focus on the most 
recent 10-year period, though other periods may also hold 
interesting lessons for policy. Industries are categorised as 
Type A, B, C, or D as follows. Only industries with a relatively 
large employment share are discussed.
A: Above median wage growth and elasticity.
B: Above median wage growth and below median elasticity.
C: Below median wage growth and above median elasticity.
D: Below median wage growth and below median elasticity.
On the positive side, large employers such as leather, foot-
wear, and knitwear have displayed good wage growth as well 
as employment growth in the organised sector in the past 
decade. It is possible that this has come at the expense of 
employment in the unorganised sector. On a more mixed note, 
employment-intensive industries such as food processing, tex-
tiles, and apparel have shown a weak capacity for employment 
generation while posting higher than median rates of wage 
growth. The opposite is the case for motor vehicles where 
job creation has been strong, but wage growth has been low, 
possibly coming from a reliance on contract labour.
Interestingly, apparel and knitwear, leather and footwear 
were also the industries that performed better than average in 
translating productivity growth into wage growth. This result 
seems somewhat counter-intuitive given the reputation of 
these industries for sweatshop conditions.
Conclusions
The role of the manufacturing sector in bringing about a struc-
tural transformation in developing economies by absorbing 
surplus labour from the agriculture and informal sector has 
been debated extensively in recent years (Haraguchi et al 
2018). India is often cited as an example of an economy that 
has “missed the manufacturing bus” and has instead experi-
enced service-led growth (Cantore et al 2017; Ministry of 
Finance 2015). On the other hand, many scholars have also 
argued in favour of a renewed strategic industrial policy to 
actively promote manufacturing in India (Mehrotra 2020; 
Nagaraj 2017; Thomas 2019).
In this article, we have tried to show that there is much to 
learn from a detailed analysis of the organised manufacturing 
sector. The distinct differences between the three sub-periods 
show that the policy regime and the international environment 
may have dramatic effects, even given the same geographical 
and institutional conditions. Further, industries differ widely 
in their ability to create jobs and deliver wage growth amidst 
generalised productivity increases. In India, some stories, such as 
the decline of organised textile manufacturing and the rise of 
the informal power-loom sector, are well known. But, others 
such as the performance of apparel or food are less so. They 
deserve further investigation in order to identify the factors that 
contributed to job growth and wage growth simultaneously.
In conclusion, the recent performance of Indian organised 
manufacturing suggests that this sector may yet serve an im-
portant role in India’s structural transformation. We hope that 
this study will stimulate efforts at addressing this issue further.
Notes
1  For details, see EViews users guide, http://
www.eviews.com/help/helpintro.html#page/
content/preface.html (viewed on 5 February 
2020).
2  The NIC 3-digit codes used in Figure 7, Figure 
8a, and Figure 8b are defi ned at http://www.
epwrfi ts.in/ASITreeview_ThreeDigitIndustry.
aspx (viewed on 11 February 2020).
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